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I. Issues and Traditions
In the Timaeus Plato marks out as one of the central 
components of his cosmology a god who is unique and rational 
and who is described essentially as a craftsman, and indeed 
who is typically referred to simply as the Craftsman or Demiurge. 
The Demiurge also appears in the Republic VII (530a) and 
appears at crucial junctures in all of the late, so-called 
'critical' dialogues which expound positive doctrines, that 
is, the Sophist (265c-266d), Statesman (269c-273e), and Philebus 
(26e-27b, 28d-30e).(1) And yet in discussions of the Platonic 
cosmology the question "what does the Demiurge do?" is rarely 
raised. There are three reasons for this rarity.
First, there is a very strong tendency in Platonic criticism 
to take the figure of the Demiurge non-literally, that is, as 
not being intended as an actual component of Plato's cosmological 
commitments. There has been a dazzling array of readings of 
Plato's cosmology which take Plato as meaning something quite 
different than what he says when he describes the Demiurge.
The Demiurge has been taken as a mere doublet of the World-Soul 
(Archer-Hind), or for the rational part of it (Cornford), as 
a general symbol for any craftsman-like activity (Cherniss), 
as only a hypothetical entity serving merely as a literary foil 
in the exposition of the human statesman and the World-Soul 
(Herter) and as a "sublation" of the World-Soul (Rosen).(2)
These diverse strategies should be seen, I think, largely as 
(unneeded) charitable attempts to distance Plato's thought 
from Christian thought. If these strategies are correct the 
Demiurge is either reduced to some other component of Plato's
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cosmology or is demoted to a mere expository device and so the 
question of what he does tends not significantly to arise. The 
issue of whether the Demiurge is to be taken seriously as a com­
ponent of Plato's cosmology is admittedly complex, but given 
the frequency and prominence with which the Demiurge appears in 
both mythical (Timaeus, Statesman) and non-mythical settings 
(Republic, Sophist, Philebus), his excision from the Platonic 
metaphysics through what invariably turn out to be idiosyncratic 
hermeneutics seems a desperate measure. I shall speak as though 
the Demiurge is meant as a non-reducible component of the Platonic 
metaphysics. And insofar as it is possible to give an account 
of his workings which both is coherent and gives the Demiurge a 
peculiar function in the Platonic cosmology, then arguments for 
non-literal readings of the Demiurge are considerably weakened; 
for such arguments are either based on alleged contradictions 
inherent in literal readings or based on considerations of 
cosmological economy.
The question of whether the Demiurge is a serious non­
reducible component of the Platonic cosmology overlaps with 
the much debated question of whether Plato intended the Demiurge's 
act of initially forming the ordered world to be read literally.(3) 
Though I am inclined toward a literal reading, my interpretation 
of the Demiurge will in fact be neutral on this issue.
A second reason why the question of what the Demiurge does 
tends not to arise is that strong and persistent Neo-platonic 
strands in Plato criticism have tended to focus interpretive 
attention on questions of status rather than on questions of 
function. Thus we typically find critical worries over whether 
in ontological status or order the Demiurge is superior to or 
inferior to the Ideas or on a par with them, and if the last 
case, whether the Demiurge is to be identified with the Ideas 
in general (or with an aspect of them) or more specifically with 
the Idea of the good. Other types of status questions that have 
received critical attention deal with the temporal status and 
psycho-rational status of the Demiurge (is he timelessly eternal? 
sempiternal? or does he possess some other temporal mode? is he 
simply equivalent to reason? or something which possesses reason? 
is he a soul?). If these are an inquiry's dominant types of 
interpretive questions, then again the question of what role 
the Demiurge might play in Plato's scheme tends to be down 
played.(4)
A third reason for this same result is a general inclination 
in the last thirty years of the Anglo-American tradition of 
Platonic scholarship to be generally dismissive of cosmological 
issues. The reasonableness of this inclination is enhanced if the 
Timaeus is taken as a dialogue of the middle rather than late 
period. In this case, so it is claimed, the epistemological and 
logical concerns which wax so large in the late 'critical' dialogues 
can be examined without the incumbrances of the extensive meta-
3physical commitments made in the Timaeus and middle period 
dialogues.(5) Further how the metaphysics of the middle 
period is construed is almost entirely based on its exposition 
in the Republic V(476a ff), of which the Timaeus is taken as 
a mere fanciful spin-off. Though I am neutral on the issue 
of the dating of the Timaeus, the interpretation of the 
Demiurge which I will be advancing will place the interests 
of the Timaeus squarely within the epistemological and logical 
concerna of the late group, especially the Philebus.
II. General Interpretation
When the Demiurge is given a positive interpretation, 
he is generally taken (implicitly or explicitly) to be an 
artist in a narrow sense, that is, as a producer of beauty.
Beauty is construed as a final or intrinsic good, and so 
the Demiurge in fashioning the world, as a whole and in all 
its detail, is thought to improve upon it by making it 
beautiful. The world after his craftings, moldings, and 
shapings is better than before in the sense that a world 
consisting entirely of Henry Moore sculptures would be 
thought to be a better world than one consisting entirely of 
dirt clods. The Demiurge's improvements are not (or are not 
primarily) meant, on this account, to be functional or to 
serve some further end. If they are functional, their function 
is simply to provide objects which tend to produce harmless, 
pure sensual pleasures. Such pleasures themselves may be 
counted as intrinsic, though not very significant, goods 
(Republic 584b, Philebus 51b). In this way the Demiurge would 
act like a cosmetologist or interior decorator, who takes 
over something rough and disheveled and makes it look better.
The Demiurge's standard of taste in this project will be 
impeccable, since he has the beauty of the Platonic Forms 
as his model (Timaeus 28a6-7). I suggest though that this 
in fact is not the nature of the Demiurge's project.
I will be arguing rather that the Demiurge's project is 
directed to an epistemological end rather than an aesthetic 
one. The Demiurge is bent on improving the world's intelli­
gibility rather than its looks. Specifically, I will be 
contending that what the Demiurge does is to introduce 
standards or measures into the phenomenal realm by imaging 
as best he can the nature of Forms where Forms are construed 
as standards or measures (section IV).(6) There will, then, 
be two levels of standards or measures in the Platonic 
metaphysics. On the one hand, there are Ideal standards 
and on the other hand, there will be demiurgically produced 
standards immanent in the phenomenal realm (section V). The 
function of the immanent standards is to serve as the 
objects of true opinion in much the way that the Ideas serve 
as the objects of knowledge (section IV) . The Demiurge's project, 
then, I suggest, is to introduce into the world conditions which 
make possible the formation of true opinions. And he
4does this by trying to introduce into the world standards 
which are derivative upon the Ideal standards. What then 
are the properties of the Demiurge's Ideal model which are 
relevant to this project?
III. The Demiurge's Model
Each Form will have two broad classes of properties.
First, each will have properties which distinguish it from 
all the other Forms, properties in virtue of which each is 
the particular Form it is. Let us call these internal or 
proper attributes of a Form. Second, a Form will have 
properties simply in virtue of being a Form. It will share 
these properties with all the other Forms. Let us call 
these properties which Forms have qua Forms external, formal, 
or metaphysical properties. Examples of such properties 
are: being what really is (Republic 597d, Phaedrus 247c,
Philebus 59d), being the intelligible (Republic 477a, Timaeus 
28a, 52a), having some sorts of unity (Republic 476a, Philebus 
15a-b, 16d-e), which minimally include being unique (Republic 
596a6-b3) and being Ρ-ονοευδές (simple, of one kind?) (Phaedo 
78d5, 80b2, 83e2, Symposium 211bl, e4), possessing some 
particular sort of self-identity (Phaedo 78e, 80a) and possess­
ing some sort of permanence, stability, or eternality (Timaeus 
28a, 29b, 52a). What precisely Plato means by assigning each 
of these properties to the Forms is a matter of great debate. 
If, however, we construe Forms primarily as standards or 
paradigms, we can make a broad distinction among these formal 
or external properties.
On the one hand. Forms as standards will have among their 
formal properties what I will call functional properties.
These are the properties which a Form-Standard has as an 
instrument fulfilling a role in Plato's scheme of things.
These properties will primarily be epistemological. Forms 
have two epistemological roles. First they in themselves 
are in some sense objects of knowledge and second they, as 
standards or measures, allow us to identify, by reference to 
them, the types and kinds of other things. Thus by reference 
to the Standard Meter Stick I can identify other things as 
being a meter long. Further, and perhaps derivatively from 
this second role. Forms as standards serve as models for the 
practical projects (both productive and moral) of rational 
agents.
On the other hand. Forms as standards will have among 
their formal properties what I shall call standard-establishing 
properties. These will be the properties requisite to a 
standard's ability to serve as a standard, that is, requisite 
to it having the functional properties it has. Most notable 
among these properties is some sort of permanence. A standard
5which can change with respect to that in virtue of which 
other things are identified by reference to it is not a 
(good) standard. Importantly, Plato also seems to interpret 
uniqueness as a standard-establishing property of the 
Ideas, and gives two arguments to this effect (Republic X,
597c; Timaeus 31a4-7).
IV. The Demiurge's Use of the Model
If the properties of the Ideas are as I have suggested, 
then in creating sensible standards immanent in the phenomenal 
realm, standards which image the Ideal standards, the Demiurge 
will have to do two sorts of things. First, he will take over 
from the phenomenal flux an instance or image of a Form, 
an instance which he wishes to make into a standard instance 
or paradigm case. He will try the best he can to make this 
instance as like as possible in content to the standard of 
which it is an instance; that is, he will try to reproduce 
as accurately as possible the internal or proper attributes 
of the Form. And he does this by eliminating any degree to 
which the instance might on its own fall short of its measure.
So immanent standards will be 'perfect' particulars or 'perfect' 
instances. By "perfect particular" I mean a particular which 
corresponds precisely to the Forrn of which it is an instance.
If I stretch a rubber band from its relaxed length to the 
length of the room, then at exactly one point in the stretching 
process the rubber band will correspond precisely in length 
to The Standard Meter Stick in Paris; at that one point it 
is a perfect particular of that standard. At other lengths 
the rubber band is a degenerate instance of the standard; it 
falls away from the standard as being greater or less than 
its measure.(7)
All immanent standards will be perfect particulars, but 
not all perfect particulars will serve as standards. For, 
second, aside from making the standard case to-be a perfect 
particular, the Demiurge will also have to invest it with 
certain standard-establishing properties in order to enhance 
the prospects of the instance serving adequately as a standard 
case. Fixedness or stability is one such property which 
improves a particular's aptness to serve as a standard. A 
rubber band even though it is stretched to exactly the length 
of the Standard Meter Stick will not make a useful stand-in 
for The Standard Meter Stick as a measure of length; for it, 
on its own, lacks stability and will easily change its length 
(as we know by continuing to measure it under different 
conditions against The Standard Meter Stick). So too, if the 
pound measure in my shop is made of dry ice, it will change 
its weight as it sublimes, and so it will serve less well 
as a standard than a weight made, say, of iron. We can 
always tell of these derivative stand-in standards that they 
have changed, by comparing them to the one original standard 
for their kind (The Standard Meter, The Standard Pound).
6In reproducing the standard-establishing properties of 
the Ideas, the Demiurge's project may be thought of as trying 
to introduce some of the Ideality of the Ideas into the 
phenomenal realm. But the Demiurge's abilities to perform 
this task are highly restricted. What the Demiurge can do is 
limited to a large extent by the way the world is given to him. 
He is not omnipotent like the ^Christian God. He does not 
invent his materials, he discovers them. And in his materials 
there is a certain cussedness, which can partially defeat 
the enactment of his fully rational creative desires. The 
Demiurge can only make the world as like a_s i_s possible to 
the Ideal model (tva ώς ομοιότατος αύτψ κατά δύναμιν η,
38b8-cl, cf. 39el).
In some cases, it will be impossible for him to introduce 
the same standard-establishing properties which the Ideas 
have. Thus, if, as I think is the case, non-corporeality 
is one of the standard-establishing properties of the Ideas, 
this will be a property which the Demiurge will be unable 
to introduce into the phenomenal realm to any degree. In 
other cases, while he will not be able to confer upon the 
standard cases exactly the same standard-establishing property 
which the Ideas have, he will nonetheless be able to provide 
a passable substitute. Thus, while the Demiurge cannot provide 
standard cases with the sort of permanence which the Ideas 
have, nonetheless he can provide them an ersatz permanence 
(37d) which serves in a pinch to provide the constancy which 
standards require in order to be standards.
I will now defend this general interpretation of what the 
Demiurge does. First, I will show that Plato does not 
suppose that only Forms can serve in a way as standards, but 
he also believes that there are such things as standards 
immanent in the phenomenal realm and that these immanent 
standards are the product of demiurgic activity (section V). 
Second, I will show that the Demiurge's intent is indeed 
epistemological and will elaborate upon the cognitive role 
of the immanent standards (section VI). I shall end by 
suggesting that the figure of the Demiurge is more coherent 
than usually thought (sections VII and VIII).
V. Immanent Standards
Textual evidence that Plato did believe that there are 
such things as standards immanent in the phenomenal realm 
and that he did not suppose that only Forms serve as standards 
comes from several diverse sources.
Within the Timaeus itself, the distinction between tran­
scendent standards and immanent standards is drawn in the very 
opening section of Timaeus' discourse where he is laying out 
his principles. Here it is claimed that there are two kinds 
of models, standards, or paradigms (παραδείγματα, 28c6- 
29a2). One kind is called "eternal," a paraphrastic reference
7to the Ideas. And, in contrast, one kind is called "generated"
( γεγονός )f by which I take Plato, in virtue of the contrast, 
to mean nothing more than "is part of the phenomenal world of 
becoming."(8) Later in the Timaeus Plato makes it clear that 
he intends the Demiurge's making of time to be viewed as a 
production of such immanent sensible standards (37c-38e). (9)
This is particularly important for my interpretation. For 
the production of time is seen as paradigmatic for all of the 
Demiurge's craftings (39e3-4).
When Plato says that the Demiurge makes time, he does not 
mean that the Demiurge creates temporal succession. The 
Demiurge does not, that is, create events as having a deter­
minate, transitive, asymmetrical, irreflexive order. Rather 
the Demiurge makes the means of measuring such orderings 
against a standard. He makes a clock (or more precisely 
clockis) by which we tell time (where 'time' here is taken 
colloquially). A clock is a regularly repeating motion with 
some marker which makes possible the counting of the repetitions. 
Plato initially expresses this understanding of time viewed 
as a clock rather abstractly in his claim that time proceeds 
or (more precisely) revolves numerably (37d6-7, 38a7-8). Stated 
more concretely, in the clocks which the Demiurge makes it 
is the bodies of the«planets— the wandering 'stars' --which 
are the clocks' markers and it is the planets' circuits which 
are the regularly repeating motions. Thus Plato says that 
the planets (viewed as moving bodies) come into being to define 
(or mark out, διορισμός ) and guard or preserve numbers of 
time(38c6). They "define" numbers of time in that they are 
the clocks' markers. And the planets "guard" or "preserve" 
numbers of time in that each of their continuous wanderings 
offers a single referent for numerable motions and thus 
guarantee that the numberable motions are indeed repetitions 
which are requisite for motions to serve as a clock. When 
then Plato says that the planets collectively produce time 
(38e4-5) or more simply are time (39dl), he means by time 
something technical. He means that time is a clock, a clock 
by which we measure that which is measurable about motion 
and rest. The time which the Demiurge creates is a standard 
or measure immanent in the phenomenal realm, a standard which 
images an Ideal standard (37d5, 7; 38a7; 38b8-cl; 39el-2).
Immanent demiurgically generated standards or paradigms 
are also to be found in the Republic. In the central books, 
we are told that the ordered parts of the phenomenal realm 
("the embroidery of the sky") serve as παραδείγματα 
(529d7-8) in the study of the special theoretical sciences 
(astronomy in particular). It is clear from the context that 
the meaning of the term παράδειγμα here falls within 
the range of its senses which cluster around "exemplar" 
rather than around "example" or even "parallel case" which 
are both other perfectly common meanings of the term. For 
these immanent paradigms are treated like blueprints in nature 
and function: "It is just as if one came upon plans carefully
8drawn and executed by the sculptor Daedalus or some other 
craftsman ( δημιουργός ) or artist" (529d8-e3). Plato 
in his analogy here is referring to the custom of Greek 
sculptors, in making their final products (say, marble 
horses), to work from models or paradigms which themselves 
are artificial objects (clay horses) rather than to work 
directly from models which are natural objects (living horses ) . 
(10)
The paradigms which make up the embroidery of the sky 
are explicitly said to be the products of a demiurge (530a6, 
cf. 507c6-7), and are explicitly said to be material and 
visible ( σώμά τε δχοντα και, όρώμενα , 530b3) . Some of 
these earthly paradigms turn out, as in the case of the 
Timaeus, to be the parts of time: "days," "nights," "months,"
"years," and "other stars" (530a7-8), by which designations 
it is clear, especially given the context, that Plato is 
referring to measures or standards rather than to measure­
ments taken from standards. *
That Plato believed that some perfect instances of Forms 
are standards or measures is most clearly and persistently 
articulated in the Philebus. In it we find both transcendental 
measures (25d3 BT; 66a6-7), and measures immanent in the world 
(26a3, 26d9, 66bl-2).(11) The immanent measures of the Philebus 
are phenomena which correspond exactly to a Form and which 
have had removed from them by demiurgic activity the propensity 
to admit of degrees or to be subject to the more and the less. 
(For measures as immanent characteristics produced among pheno­
mena, which are otherwise subject to the more and the less, 
especially see Philebus 24c7-dl.)
VI. Demiurgic Intent
The introduction by the Demiurge of measures or standards 
into the phenomenal realm is extremely important for Plato's 
epistemology. For it means that if one has only the phenomenal 
realm (and not also the Ideal realm) as the object of one's 
cognition, nevertheless, one is not limited to making judgments 
based entirely on merely relative comparison or merely relative 
measurement. By "merely relative measurement" I mean that 
ability which Plato claims we have, usually by direct sensory 
inspection and in any case without reference to measures or 
standards, to say that, onæme scale of degrees, one thing 
is greater than another, or even possesses the same degree 
as another, but which does not entail the further ability to 
say what degree on the relevant scale of degrees either thing 
possesses. We would have the latter ability only if we could 
appeal to a standard or measure (Statesman 283c-285a). When 
we are provided with immanent standards, we have the improved 
epistemological skill of being able to make precise identi­
fications of phenomenal kinds, without having to make
9appeals (at least directly) to anything other than the 
phenomena.
As an illustrative example of what Plato means by 
merely relative measure and measure against a standard, 
let us take Plato's own example of (celestial) clocks.
The Demiurge in creating clocks is not (as mentioned) 
creating temporal succession. Temporal succession exists 
whether clocks exist or not. Further Plato is not claiming 
that in an acosmic world in which there are no clocks we 
would (should we exist) be unable to perceive and make 
judgments about temporal succession. In a world without 
clocks we still can make merely relative measurements of 
time, that is, raw judgments of earlier and later, without 
appeal to a clock as a standard, just as we can make merely 
relative measurements of length, weight, and the like, without 
appeals to standards for those dimensions. Thus, if I snapped 
the fingers of one hand, paused, and then snapped the fingers 
of the other, anyone in the room who was paying attention 
could say which of the two events occurred first without 
appealing to a clock. But the two events could also be given 
a temporal ordering by appealing to a clock as a standard of 
measure for dating events. Each snap could be given a date 
by reference to a clock, say, 6:31 and 6:32 and given a temporal 
ordering as the result of this matching of each event severally 
to parts of the clock and then comparing the parts rather than 
as a result of comparing the two events directly against each 
other. Judgments of past and future are simply judgments of 
earlier and later which have as one of their relata the very 
act of making the judgment. Such judgments also may be made 
either by merely relative assessment or as the result of 
assigning determinate dates with the aid of a clock.
In general then, the presence of immanent standards will 
allow us to identify individuals correctly and precisely. 
In the case of temporal measures this takes the form of 
assigning dates (what time is it? It is 6:01). Derivatively, 
immanent measures allow us to make precise comparisons 
between things measured; for we are able to compare their 
determinate measures. Without appeals to standards or 
measures we are only able to say that one thing is greater 
or less than another (earlier or later than another) but 
without being able to say what either thing determinately is.
In the Philebus Plato spells out more specifically what 
he takes to be the cognitive and practical functions of 
immanent standards or measures. They are the objects of 
true opinion and of the applied arts and crafts (like account­
ing) (Philebus 55d-e, 66bl-2), in the same manner in which 
the transcendental measures are the objects of reason and 
the purely theoretic sciences (like number theory) (57d2, 
58d6-7, 61d-e, 66a-b). False opinion has as its object not
10
nothing nor even what is not the case, but rather the phe­
nomena which fall away from standards, phenomena, that is, 
which are subject to the more and the less and which on 
their own are approached only by merely relative measurement. 
Such objects tend to cause errors of judgment and practice, 
when we have only them before us and so are unable to identify 
and assess them with reference to standards (so also Republic 
584a, 586b-c). This view of false opinion can be more 
easily understood, if it is remembered that opinion is for 
Plato at least as much a matter of pragmatics as of semantics. 
Opinion is more a matter of determining how we get along in 
the world than a determination of propositional accuracy.
Even true opinion is to a large degree a matter of guessing, 
forecast and conjecture (Philebus 55e5-56al, 62cl-2). True 
opinion is what allows us to succeed at our projects in the 
world, by guessing correctly the right course of action 
(Republic VI, 506c). Possessing models or blueprints for 
identification and guidance is of course very useful in this 
state of affairs. We have a better grade of cognition if we 
have access to standards and measures than if we do not.
The presence of measures and standards in the phenomenal 
realm then benefits that realm by largely constituting its 
intelligibility. For it is they which allow us to make accurate 
and useful identifications when we have only the phenomenal 
realm before us. I suggest that this sort of benefit is the 
primary aim of the Demiurge's craftings. The improvements 
which he works on the phenomena are primarily epistemological.
VII. The Scope and Limits of the Demiurge
The interpretation which I have given the Demiurge provides 
a sufficient clue in explaining one of his major (though 
puzzling) projects. One of the Demiurge's chief creations 
(aside from making 'time' and its instruments, the planets) 
is his making of the whole universe into a unique living-thing 
(30c-31b), an amalgam of the World-Soul and World-Body (34b,
36e) .
We are in a position to give a precise and coherent 
rationale for the world's uniqueness. The Demiurge's aim 
is to produce an immanent standard of animality. The specific 
function which the Demiurge assigns to this immanent standard 
is to serve as a model for our own rational cognitive processes. 
By using it as a standard and by imitating it, we come to 
possess those cognitive faculties, powers, and processes which 
result in the possession and articulation of truths (47b6-c4 
with 43e-44b and 37b6-8). The Demiurge, in making the World- 
Living-thing a standard, will therefore invest it with whatever 
standard-establishing properties he can. Thus it is invested 
with the same permanence or everlastingness which the standards 
of time possess (36e). If, as I have suggested, uniqueness 
is taken by Plato as a standard-establishing property, then
11
the Demiurge will invest his immanent standards with this 
property, if it is possible to do so. In the case of the 
World-living-thing (and possibly only in this case) this 
project is possible. And so the world is made unique.
In the case of temporal measures, the Demiurge cannot 
introduce uniqueness into the phenomenal realm, given that 
(among other things) Plato had to save the appearances with 
which that realm actually presents us and that it indeed 
presents us with a variety of celestial 'clocks', indeed 
at least eight of them (38d, 39b,c). And so in the celestial 
realm we are left with a situation rather like a pawnshop in 
which there are many watches running both severally (38d4-6) 
and collectively at different rates (39c6-7). The same claims 
are made of the various temporal paradigms in the Republic, 
where their deviations from conditions of constancy are directly 
attributed to their corporeality (530b3). And the result (as 
we would expect on my reading) is a reduced intelligibility 
available for those who try to tell time accurately: the
measures of time are mutually incommensurable (Republic 530a7-b3, 
cf. 531al-3) and are bewildering due to their number and 
intricacy (Timaeus 39dl-2) .
VIII. Plato's Sane Craftsman
If the Demiurge's project is, as I have suggested, to 
introduce standards into the phenomenal realm by the co-joint 
production of accurate images and introduction of standard- 
establishing properties, then Plato avoids a number of serious 
charges which critics have standardly laid against him.
First, Plato and his Demiurge are not conceptually 
confused about the nature of the Demiurge's project.
Specifically they have not confused the production of 
properties the presence of which in a thing makes it in­
herently good with the production of properties that make 
a thing an accurate, faithful or correct image of an 
original.(12) Rather, Plato and his Demiurge realize that 
for an image to serve as an immanent standard it must have 
two sorts of properties. On the one hand, to serve as an 
immanent standard for the type of things for which it is 
to be the standard, a phenomenal image needs to reproduce 
accurately the characteristics of its original which make 
its original the original it is. The Demiurge will try to 
reproduce accurately the proper or internal attributes of 
the original in the image which is to serve as a standard.
If we were to pick or produce a painting of Winston Churchill 
with the aid of which we were going to proceed to identify 
other paintings as being paintings of Winston Churchill, we 
would want our standard painting to image as accurately as 
possible the distinctive features of Winston Churchill. On
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the other hand, for an image to be a standard, it will also 
need those standard-establishing properties which make it 
possible for, and enhance the aptness of, the image to serve 
as a standard. These will typically include properties like 
orderliness, stability, and unity. Now it is not hard to 
understand that these properties might be misconstrued by 
critics as being, just in themselves, final constituents of 
Platonic goodness. Neo-platonists, critics who have a right- 
wing political bent or who think Plato has such a bent, and 
the aesthetically-minded are all likely to suppose that these 
properties of order, stability, and unity just are what it 
means to be good for Plato and that the Demiurge needs no 
further justification for their introduction into the world. 
Thus these critics will claim that if the Demiurge should make 
any improvements in the world at all, he will make these 
improvements (order, stability, unity). Such a critic is 
Cornford, who in speaking of the unique world argument (30c- 
31b) declares: "Uniqueness is a perfection, and the world
is better for possessing it" (p. 43). From this perspective 
of viewing uniqueness, stability and the like as intrinsic 
goods or perfections, it will naturally enough appear that 
the Demiurge is involved in two wholly unrelated projects:
1) the making of accurate images and 2) the introduction of 
properties which count as intrinsic goods. The correct reading, 
though, is to view uniqueness, stability and the like as 
having instrumental value, as making possible and enhancing 
the ability of images to serve as standards. The making of 
accurate images and the introducing of standard-establishing 
properties are co-joint parts of the Demiurge's project.
Plato's arguments giving the rationales for the Demiurge's 
actions, particularly the unique world argument and the account 
of the 'eternity' of the world, have been accused of constituting 
gross fallacies of division.(13) According to this charge, 
the Demiurge allegedly supposes that since the world is (to 
be) an instance of a Form, and since this Form is an instance 
of uniqueness and eternity, therefore the world is (to be) 
unique and eternal for these reasons. However, that some 
phenomenal objects are to serve as standards (of a sort) 
motivates their coming to possess the standard-establishing 
properties of the Ideas, including uniqueness and permanence. 
This motivation is quite independent of these phenomenal 
objects simply being instances of the Forms of which they 
indeed are instances. Therefore, the Demiurge's thought is 
not riddled with a fallacy of division.
The Demiurge has also been accused of being quite mad, 
since he at least seems to be indiscriminately reproducing in 
his copy each and every property of his original. Such an 
indiscriminate reproduction of properties would be a crazy 
way of proceeding for a number of reasons. First, sometimes 
an original will possess properties which are irrelevant to its
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serving as an original (for example, having dents and scratches). 
One would not indiscriminately reproduce these in a copy.
Second, there are some properties of an original which, though 
relevant to the original serving as an original, are wholly 
inappropriate for the product for which the model is used.
Thus it is entirely appropriate that an architect's blueprint 
should be made of paper, but one would not make a house of 
paper because its plans were made of paper. Third, an original 
will possess some properties which are logically impossible 
to reproduce in a copy (for example, the age of the original 
and the numerical self-identity of the original).
On my reading of the Demiurge he is not subject to these 
charges. He does not indiscriminately reproduce the properties 
of his model, rather his project of making immanent standards 
provides him with a principle for selecting which of the 
attributes of his original are to be reproduced. It only 
appears that the Demiurge is picking and reproducing properties 
indiscriminately because so many of the attributes of the Ideas 
are standard-establishing properties and he will try to re­
produce all of these. The Demiurge's choices are relevant 
and appropriate, guided by the nature of his specific project. 
When a relevant property of his model can not(for whatever 
reason) be reproduced, the Demiurge will substitute 
a related stand-in property to serve in its stead.
The Demiurge is therefore not wanting in intelligence, 
ingenuity, or sanity. I suggest that the figure of the Demiurge 
is a coherent one. Reasonable attacks upon the Demiurge will 
not take the form of accusations of absurdity, but will have 
to take the form of trying to show that what Plato wishes to 
explain by the figure of the Demiurge, namely, our ability to 
make accurate identifications of phenomenal types, can be 
achieved with considerably less conspicuous metaphysical 
consumption, just as the gods of the cosmological or first 
cause arguments are perhaps shown to be otiose by Newtonian 
mechanics.
IX. Theisms
If my reading of the Demiurge's aims and practices is 
anywhere near correct, the figure of the Demiurge of the 
Timaeus is a singular accomplishment in the history of ideas.
We do not find a figure with his function and nature in either 
prior or subsequent theological speculation. The strongest 
traditions of theistic speculation in the West have treated 
the divine either as primarily a source of motion or as primarily 
a source of order. The one tradition can be traced back to 
Empedocles, whose Love and Strife set the world's components 
in motion. This tradition blossoms in the cosmological and 
first cause arguments for the existence of God. The other 
tradition can be traced back to Anaxagoras, whose divine Mind
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set the world's components in order. This tradition blossoms 
in the teleological arguments for the existence of God.
If my interpretation of Plato's Demiurge is correct, 
the Demiurge does not fit into either of these traditions.
For, on the one hand, far from being primarily a source of 
motion, the Demiurge is actually a source of stability and 
permanence, since these are conditions which enhance the 
prospects of some phenomena serving as standard cases. This 
is not to deny that the Demiurge might be thought of as 
necessarily moving things around: a forge worker will, after
all, move things around in his project of tempering a piece 
of steel. But, it does mean that the Demiurge is not hypothesized 
to explain the origin or perpetual occurrence of motion in 
the universe, as gods are called upon to do in cosmological 
arguments, including Plato's own version of those arguments 
in the laws X (894e-895b).(14)
Further, on the other hand, though the Demiurge may be 
viewed as a source of order, regularity and other 'intrinsic' 
goods, neither is their production his final end nor is he 
hypothesized in order to explain their presence in the world, 
as are hypothesized the gods of teleological arguments. The 
nature of the Demiurge is completely compatible with Plato's 
claim that there are "traces" of order even in the pre-cosmic 
era (53b2).(15) The Demiurge is not responsible for all 
regularity and order. He is responsible only for those 
final forms of order which proximately serve functions and 
manifest purpose. Such final orderings may be entirely new 
formations, but they may equally well be, to a large degree, 
encorporations of pre-existing orderly elements, which the 
Demiurge simply appropriates without alteration from the pre­
cosmos (see especially Timaeus 46c-47a). Prior to their 
appropriation such elements will not correctly be said to 
manifest purpose; afterwards they will. But whether a demiurgic 
ordering takes the form of an appropriation or a formation, 
it is carried out not as a final end on its own but as part 
of the Demiurge's project of making immanent standards.
If the Demiurge bears a resemblance to any of the gods of 
the Western theistic traditions, it is to the god of the 
ontological argument, or at least, of those variants of the 
argument (like that in Descartes's Third Meditation) which 
employ the principle of sufficient reason. For both the 
Demiurge and the god of this ontological argument are hypothe­
sized as necessary beings in consequence of certain epistemo­
logical 'phenomena'. Though, even here there is substantial 
difference between the two. For the god of the (Cartesian) 
ontological argument is hypothesized as being necessary to 
explain sufficiently an agent's actual possession of a
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particular concept (e.g*, my actual possession of the idea 
of infinity). But the Demiurge is hypothesized, on my ac­
count, as being necessary simply for establishing the con­
ditions in virtue of which we potentially possess all con­
cepts (i.e·, possess the means of forming true opinions 
with regard to all phenomenal types).
It is perhaps because theistic speculation in the West 
has been so strongly influenced by such a limited number of 
traditions that the nature of Plato's Demiurge has remained 
largely obscure.(16)
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A divine demiurge also appears in the Laws X (902e-904c).
I have argued elsewhere that the projects and commitments of 
the Laws X are incompatible with the cosmology and theology 
of the Timaeus. Nothing that is claimed of the Demiurge and 
his projects in this paper should be construed as applying to 
the Demiurge of the Laws X. See "Plato's Final thoughts on 
Evil: Laws X , 900-905," Mind 87 (1978), 572-575; "The Mechanism
of Flux in Plato's Timaeus," Apeiron 14 (1980), 96-114.
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R.D. Archer-Hind, The Timaeus of Plato (London, 1888), 
pp. 37-40; F.M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London, 1937), 
pp. 34-39, 76; H.F. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 
and the Academy I (Baltimore, 1944), p. 607, cf. 425; Hans 
Herter, "Gott und die Welt bei Platon," BonnJbb 158 (1958),
106-117; Stanley Rosen,"The Myth of the Reversed Cosmos,"
Rev. Metaphysics 33 (1979), 75-76. For refreshing exceptions 
to this non-literalist trend,see T.M. Robinson, Plato1s 
Psychology (Toronto, 1970), pp. 59-92 and A.E. Taylor, A 
Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford, 1928), pp. 63-67.
Taylor, though, does not think that the Timaeus expresses 
Plato's own views.
3
For arguments favoring a non-literal reading ,see Cherniss, 
pp. 421-431, and for a defense of Cherniss' views,see Leonardo 
Taran, "The Creation Myth in Plato's Timaeus" in Essays in 
Ancient Greek Philosophy, J.P. Anton and G.L. Kustas (eds.), 
(Albany, 1971), pp. 372-407. For an attack on Cherniss' views, 
see Gregory Vlastos, "Creation in the Timaeus: Is it a Fiction?"
in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, R.E. Allen (ed.) , (London, 
1965) pp. 409-419; see also Robinson, pp. 58-68.
4
For some discussion of these sorts of status questions , 
see J.B. Skemp, The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues 
(Amsterdam, 1967), pp. 163-170 and "The Relation of Reason 
to Soul in the Platonic Cosmology," Apeiron 16 (1982), 21-26.
5
For an early dating with this aim m  mind ,see G.E.L. Owen, 
"The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's Dialogues" in Studies in 
Plato's Metaphysics, pp. 313-338.
6In the late dialogues "measure" (μέτρον = "limit," πέρας, 
Philebus 52c) tends to replace "paradigm" ( παράδειγμα ) 
as Plato's term of choice for the notion 'examplar'. Plato 
in the late dialogues begins to use παράδειγμα (when used 
as a quasi-technical expression) to mean "parallel case" or 
"analogue" (Statesman 278e).
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I suggest that Plato draws in a general way the 
distinction between perfect instances and degenerate 
instances of a standard or model in the Sophist (235b-236c) 
where he distinguishes between two kinds of imitation 
( μίμησυς, 235dl). There is imitation which produces 
images ( είκούς )· These reproduce the exact proportions 
of their originals ( παραδείγματα ). And there is 
imitation which produces phantasms ( φαντάσματα ).
These, though somewhat similar to the content of their 
originals, deviate from corresponding precisely to them.
It also seems that the "immanent characters" of the 
Phaedo (103b,e) are perfect particulars of the Forms of 
which they are instances. See Alexander Nehamas, "Plato 
on the Imperfection of the Sensible World," APQ, 12 (1975), 
105-117, for a general defense of the presence of perfect 
particulars of Forms in the middle dialogues. For the 
immanent characters of the Phaedo, see esp. page 116.
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Robinson suggests that the presence here of generated 
models is a "patent fiction," that they are hypothesized as 
existing solely for the sake of argument (p.67). This would 
be a possible interpretation if this were the only text where 
generated paradigms were advanced by Plato.
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On this passage see W. K. C. Guthrie's excellent comments,
A History of Greek Philosophy V (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1978), pp. 299-301.
■*"^ For a discussion of the role of models in the production 
of Greek sculpture, see Carl Blumel, Greek Sculptors at Work 
(Glasgow, 1969) second English edition, pp. 36-39. Note 
illustration 28, in which the divine craftsman Athena is 
represented as making a clay model which a marble sculptor 
will then use.
■^In the Philebus the paronymous forms of μέτρον, viz., 
έμμετρον and σύμμετρον , generally refer to immanent rather 
than transcendent measures or standards (26a7,8; 52c4; 64d9; 
65dl0). The issue of the status of measures in the Philebus 
is much debated. For defenses that some measures in the 
Philebus are Platonic Forms, see "The Platonic Number Theory 
in Republic VII and Philebus," Isis 72 (1981), 620-627
and "Philebus 55c-62a and Revisionism" forthcoming in CJP, 
suppl. vol. IX, New Essays on Plato (1983).
This charge of conceptual confusion is laid by Richard 
Patterson, "The Unique World Argument of the Timaeus,"
Phoenix 35 (1981), 116-119.
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"The Mad Craftsman of the Timaeus," PhilRev 80 (1971),
230-235.
14For an analysis of Plato's version of the cosmological 
argument, see "The Sources of Evil Problem and the Principle 
of Motion Doctrine in Plato," Apeiron 14 (1980), 45-46.
15Vlastos thinks that Plato's commitment to some 
orderly elements in the pre-cosmos is fundamentally incoherent 
when placed against a metaphysical background which includes 
a demiurgic god ("The Disorderly Motion in the Timaeus" 
in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, pp. 389-390; also "Creation 
in the Timaeus," pp. 413-414).
16Some of the positions taken in this paper are defended 
and developed in more detail in the first two chapters of 
The Platonic Cosmology (Leiden, E.J. Brill) forthcoming.
